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CIVIL RIGHTS-SECTION 1983---WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION­
AVAILABILITY OF DAMAGES IN EXCESS OF THOSE PERMITTED 
UNDER STATE LAw-Jones v. Hildebrant, 550 P.2d 339 (Colo. 
1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1061, cert. dismissed, 432 U.S. 189 
(1977). 
The plaintiff in Jones V. Hildebrant 1 was the mother of a fif­
teen year-old black youth who was shot and killed by an on-duty 
Denver police officer. In her complaint against Officer Hildebrant, 
the City of Denver, and the County of Denver, Mrs. Jones as­
serted three causes of action. The first two claims, based on the 
Colorado wrongful death statute,2 were for the intentional and neg­
ligent killing of her son. The third cause of action, based on 42 
U.S.c. § 1983,3 alleged the intentional deprivation of her son's 
civil rights without due process of law. 4 Mrs. Jones claimed that 
her son's right to life, to freedom from physical abuse and intimida­
tion, and to the equal protection of the laws had been violated. 5 
She sought $1,500,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in 
punitive damages. 6 
1. 550 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1061, cerl. dismissed as 
improvidently granted, 432 U.S. 189 (1977). 
2. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-202 (1973) provides: 

When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default 

of another, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would, if death had not 

ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover 

damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who or 

the corporation which would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall 





3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 

or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to 

the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con­

stitution and Laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

4. 550 P.2d at 341. 

5. [d. at 345. 
6. [d. at 341. 
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The trial court ruled that her section 1983 claim "merged"7 with 
the claims under the Colorado wrongful death statute and dismissed 
it as a separate cause of action. 8 Furthermore, the court ruled that 
the wrongful death statute did not permit recovery of punitive 
damages. 9 Her recovery was limited to net pecuniary loss up to a 
maximum of $45,00010 since she was not a dependent of the de­
ceased. l1 The wrongful death claim went to the jury which re­
turned a verdict for Mrs. Jones and awarded her $1,500. 12 
On appeal Mrs. Jones' primary contention was that her section 
1983 claim should not have been dismissed because it arguably 
would have permitted her to recover damages in excess of the net 
pecuniary loss ceiling imposed by the state wrongful death rem­
edy.13 Affirming the trial court's rulings, the Colorado Supreme 
Court held that no section 1983 remedy for wrongful death exists 
independently of the state statute and that the net pecuniary loss 
7. See note 16 infra. 
8. 550 P.2d at 341. 
9. Id. 
ID. Id. The jury was instructed that the damages recoverable were limited to 
net pecuniary loss up to a $45,000 ceiling in a wrongful death action in which the 
decedent was a minor child. This common law rule was first articulated in Her­
bertson v. Russell, 150 Colo. 1l0, 371 P.2d 422 (1962). In the instant case, the court 
defined net pecuniary loss as the financial loss suffered by the plaintiff as a result of 
her child's death. It was to include the value of any services the child might have 
performed for the plaintiff, such as working around the home and running errands, 
less the expenses the plaintiff would have incurred in raising him. 550 P.2d at 341 
n.1. Recovery is not permitted for parental grief and loss of society. Id. at 342. 
11. Id. at 341. 
12. Id. In the instant case, the award apparently included funeral expenses. 
The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the instructions and the award. Id. at 341 n.1. 
13. Id. Mrs. Jones offered several theories in support of this contention. She 
argued the implied existence of a wrongful death remedy directly under § 1983.Id. 
at 342. See text accompanying notes 25-27 infra. She also contended the Colorado 
damage limitation did not apply to a § 1983 claim even when the state wrongful 
death statute is incorporated into the federal claim. 550 P.2d at 343. See note 26 infra 
and accompanying text. Aside from the wrongful death claim, she contended the 
dismissal of the § 1983 action prevented her from asserting a survival claim and a 
claim based on the loss of her own personal liberty to raise her child without unlaw­
ful interference from the state. 550 P.2d at 342. In the alternative, she argued that 
the damages awarded were inadequate as a matter of law. Id. 
Mrs. Jones was unsuccessful in her attempt to assert the survival and parenthood 
claims. The Colorado Supreme Court held that no survival action under § 1983 exists 
independently of state law and that a mother cannot sue in her own right for depriva­
tion of her constitutional right to raise her child. Id. at 345. But see Mattis v. Schnarr, 
502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974), and Jones v. McElroy, 429 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
Relying on Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923), these two courts have allowed plaintiffs to assert causes of action 
under § 1983 for loss of the right to parenthood. See note 21 infra. 
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rule was properly applied. 14 The court reasoned that if the action 
had been brought in federal court the Colorado wrongful death 
statute would have been "incorporated" into the section 1983 ac­
tion. 15 However, since the suit was brought in state court, the sec­
tion 1983 action "merged"16 into the "broader" state claim. 17 This 
holding rested on the apparent assumption that the state remedy 
was the broader one since it, unlike section 1983, allowed the City 
and County of Denver to be sued as well as the individual defen­
dant. 1s 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari19 to de­
cide whether a state's damage limitation controls in a wrongful 
death action brought pursuant to section 1983. 20 However, in a per 
curiam opinion, the Court dismissed as improvidently granted Mrs. 
Jones' petition for certiorari. 21 Thus, the United States Supreme 
Court has left unresolved the extent to which section 1983 provides 
a state court remedy when a police officer wrongfully takes a life. 22 
The following discussion capsulizes the development of remedies 
for wrongful death under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. It 
examines the conceptual difficulties which have caused an unequal 
availability of these remedies, questions the Colorado Supreme 
Court's understanding of federal procedure, and suggests alterna­
tive resolutions of the issues presented in the case. 
14. 550 P.2d at 344. 
15. ld. See note 27 infra for an explanation of "incorporation." 
16. In the law relating to rights of action, when a person takes or acquires a 
remedy of a higher nature, in legal estimation a broader remedy, than the one he 
already possesses for the same right, then his remedies in respect of the minor right 
merge in those attaching to the higher one. The less important remedy ceases to 
have an independent existence. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1140 (rev. 4th ed. 1976). 
17. 550 P.2d at 344. 
18. ld. at n.7. Municipalities are immune to suit under § 1983. Monroe v. Pape, 
365 U.S. 167 (1961). The ruling of the Colorado Supreme Court is correct only if the 
net pecuniary loss rule was properly applied to the § 1983 claim. If the damage 
limitation does not apply, the § 1983 remedy is broader in one sense since it allows 
the plaintiff to recover damages in excess of the net pecuniary loss limitation. See 
note 30 infra for a discussion of a state court's obligation to enforce federal law. 
19. 429 U.S. 1061 (1977). 
20. 432 U.S. 183, 184-85 (1977). 
21. ld. at 189. In the majority view, Mrs. Jones' only argument before the Court 
was one she did not raise in her petition for certiorari: that her personal liberty to 
raise her child without interference from the state had been infringed. See note 13 
supra. The dissent reasoned that this issue, as well as the damage limitation issue, 
was sufficiently preserved on appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court and was prop­
erly raised in her petition for certiorari. 432 U.S. at 194. 
22. State courts are likely to have an increasingly important role in the adjudi­
cation of § 1983 claims. See note 105 infra. 
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I. WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS 
A. 	 Incorporation of State Law into Section 1983 Wrongful Death 
Actions Brought in Federal Courts 
The basic issue before the Colorado Supreme Court was the 
nature of the wrongful death remedy available in actions brought 
under section 1983. The court ruled correctly that no section 1983 
remedy for wrongful death exists independently of state statutes. 23 
It observed that federal courts presiding over section 1983 actions, 
in order to provide remedies for wrongful death, "incorporate" 
state wrongful death statutes into the section 1983 cause of action. 
This allows wrongful death actions to be brought under the federal 
statute where, but for the death of the injured party, the federal 
tort remedy would have been available. 
This approach was first taken by the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit in Brazier v. Cherry.24 There, the court considered 
the legislative policy behind the Civil Rights Act, and reasoned 
that "it defies history to conclude that Congress purposely meant to 
assure to the living freedom from such unconstitutional depriva­
tions, but that, with like precision, it meant to withdraw [that] pro­
tection ... [from an injury resulting in death]. "25 Having deter­
mined that Congress intended to prohibit violence which kills as 
well as violence which injures,26 the Brazier court searched for 
23. 550 P.2d at 344-45. In Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1877), the 
United States Supreme Court recognized that no action for wrongful death exists in 
the common law. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 377-93 
(1970), for an historical analysis of this rule. As a result of the rule, it was held that 
no action for wrongful death could lie under § 1983 because that statute does not 
expressly authorize such a remedy. Federal courts sitting in § 1983 actions have 
responded by "incorporating" state wrongful death statutes into § 1983 actions. See 
text accompanying notes 24-34 infra. The same result has been reached by courts 
deciding the issue in other areas of federal law which do not expressly provide a 
wrongful death remedy in their statutory schemes. See, e.g., The Harrisburg, 119 
U.S. 199 (1886) (in the absence of a statute there is no action for wrongful death in 
federal maritime law). The Harrisburg was overruled in Moragne v. States Marine 
Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). See notes 57-58 infra and accompanying text. ' 
24. 	 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961). 
25. Id. at 404. See id. at n.9 for a comparison of criminal sanctions recognizing 
criminal accountability for injuries resulting in the death' of the victim. 
26. Support for this interpretation of the legislative intent behind the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871 was derived from Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). There, the 
United States Supreme Court extensively re-examined the legislative history of that 
act. It concluded that Congress intended the law to provide a broad remedy for all 
deprivations of civil rights. In the Court's view it is irrelevant that a state has a law 
which provides relief; the federal remedy is independent of the state remedy and the 
state remedy need not be tried before the federal one becomes available. Id. at 183. 
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a way to provide the appropriate relief. It either had to imply a 
wrongful death remedy from section 1983 itself, or find the neces­
sary language in other statutes. 
Rather than imply the remedy, the court "incorporated"27 the 
state wrongful death statute into the section 1983 action. the pro­
cedure was suggested by section 1988 of the Civil Rights Act28 
which authorizes federal district courts to draw on state law when 
federal law is "deficient" and cannot adequately protect federally 
guaranteed rights. The court reasoned that through section 1988 
Congress intended to provide any necessary remedial29 measures 
not expressly granted in other civil rights statutes. 30 The sole lim i-
The civil rights laws were enacted to provide a federal right in a federal forum 
because by "reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise," state 
laws might be inadequate or inadequately enforced, and the "claim of citizens to the 
enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guarantee.d by the Fourteenth 
Amendment might be denied by the state agencies." 365 U.S. at 180. Thus, the Mon­
roe Court did not perceive a congressional policy against a remedy for wrongful 
death under § 1983. See note 30 infra for an explanation of state court jurisdiction 
over § 1983 claims. 
27. 293 F.2d at 405. The term "incorporation" means that the wrongful death 
remedy of the state in which the § 1983 action is brought is available. In such cases, 
the state created remedy becomes part of the federal cause of action. This situation is 
distinguished from that in which the plaintiff has also asserted a state wrongful death 
claim which is merged with the § 1983 claim. For an explanation of "merger" see 
note 16 supra. 
28. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp. 1977) provides in pertinent part: 
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts 
by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all per­
sons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall 
be exercised and enforced in conformity with the Laws of the United States, 
so far as such Laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases 
where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions 
necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the 
common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of 
the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal 
cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution 
and Laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said 
courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal 
nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty. 
29. The term "remedial" is used because § 1988 does not create causes of ac­
tion; it merely supplies necessary remedies incident to the rights protected in the 
other civil rights statutes. 
30. This applies to both federal and state courts hearing § 1983 claims. Once 
jurisdiction has been established in a state court which enforces state claims similar 
to claims established by federal law, the state court may not decline to enforce the 
federal law, and must do so in the manner in which it would be enforced in the fed­
eral courts. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngs­
town R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952). 
Until recently it was unclear whether state courts have concurrent jurisdiction 
with federal district courts over § 1983 claims. The United States Supreme Court 
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tation on the use of relevant state law is that it must be consistent 
"with the Constitution and laws of the United States. "31 Finding 
the failure to provide a wrongful death remedy in section 1983 to be 
a "deficiency," the Brazier court incorporated the state wrongful 
death statute into the section 1983 action. It thereby created an 
effective remedy for violations of federally protected rights. 
Thus, the Brazier court developed a simple test to determine 
when state remedies can be used by a federal court in a section 
1983 action. The court first determines what is needed in a particu­
lar case to make the Civil Rights Act fully effective. It then decides 
whether section 1983 is "deficient" in furnishing the appropriate 
remedy. If it is, the court is directed to look to relevant state law 
to fill the gap in the federal provisions. Finally, if state law is avail­
able to fill this gap, the court must be certain that the state law is 
consistent with federal statutory and constitutional law. 32 State law 
is used only to the extent that it is "currently available" to over­
come the deficiencies in the federal statutory scheme. 33 The 
Brazier court did not decide what approach should be taken when 
section 1983 is deficient and the available state remedy is not con­
sistent with federal policy, or otherwise leaves the plaintiff without 
an effective remedy. Leaving this question aside for the moment, it 
is enough to say that the reasoning in Brazier has been adopted by 
other federal courts when dealing with wrongful death actions 
brought under section 1983. 34 
appears to have decided this issue sub silentio in Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 
(1976). In Aldinger, the Court indicated the plaintiff could have brought the § 1983 
action in state court, along with the plaintiff's state claim. See Brody v. Leamy, 90 
Misc. 2d 1, 393 N.Y.S.2d 243 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (the court grudgingly accepted jurisdic­
tion over a § 1983 claim because of Aldinger, although by its own analysis it felt 
state courts did not have jurisdiction over such claims). 
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp. 1977). From a federal standpoint, the only 
limitation upon the use of such adoptive state law, rule, or decision is that it must be 
suitable to carry the civil rights law into effect because available direct federal legis­
lation is deficient in furnishing fully effective redress. 293 F.2d at 409. 
32. 293 F.2d at 409. 
33. Id. at 408. 
34. The following cases have allowed incorporation of state wrongful death 
remedies into § 1983 actions to enable the personal representative of certain desig­
nated beneficiaries or the beneficiaries themselves to bring an action for wrongful 
death under the federal statute: Wolfer v. Thaler, 525 F.2d 977 (5th Cir.), cert. de­
nied, 425 U.S. 975 (1976); Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974); Mattis V. 
Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Wickline, 396 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. 
Okla. 1975); James V. Murphy, 392 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. Ala. 1975); Love V. Davis, 353 
F. Supp. 587 (W.D. La. 1973); Galindo v. Brownell, 255 F. Supp. 930 (S.D. Cal. 
1966). The following courts have held that § 1983 claims which accrued during the 
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B. 	 Another Approach: Creating a Federal Coml1wn Law Cause of 
Action for Wrongful Death in Maritime Law 
Just as section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for 
wrongful death, the maritime statutes do not make a remedy avail­
able for wrongful deaths which occur on state territorial waters. 35 
Federal courts sitting in maritime actions, just as those sitting in 
section 1983 actions, have turned to state law to supply the missing 
remedy. The development of maritime wrongful death remedies, 
however, did not stop with incorporation of state law. Instead, fed­
eral courts have gone on to create a federal common law wrongful 
death remedy. 
A review of this development is important for two reasons. 
First, the maritime law provides an alternative approach which has 
many analytical and practical advantages over incorporation. 36 Sec­
ond, the Colorado Supreme Court in the instant case, Jones v. Hil
debrant, relied on a maritime case, The Tungus v. Skovgaard,37 to 
support its holding that if state law is incorporated into federal law, 
it must be incorporated as an integrated whole. 38 In view of the 
results that federal courts have reached in subsequent maritime 
cases, it is doubtful whether The Tungus was good law when the 
Jones court turned to it for guidance. 
In The Harrisburg ,39 the United States Supreme Court 
applied to maritime law the rule that there is no common law ac­
tion for wrongful death. 40 To alleviate the hardship worked by this 
rule, courts have traditionally relied upon state wrongful death stat­
utes in actions under maritime law. 41 As in Brazier, incorporation 
of state law into the federal cause of action provided a remedy for 
injury resulting in death in cases in which less serious injury would 
otherwise have been actionable under the general maritime law. 
However, courts left open the question whether state law could be 
utilized in part or whether it had to be incorporated as a whole. 
lifetime of the decedent do not abate at his death but survive to his estate according 
to state law, via § 1988: Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974); Hall v. 
Wooten, 506 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1974); Javits v. Stevens, 382 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 
1974). 
35. Deaths of merchant seamen and deaths of persons on the high seas are 
covered by federal statutes. See note 60 infra. 
36. 	 See notes 58-61 infra and accompanying text. 
37. 	 358 U.S. 588 (1959). 
38. 	 See note 98 infra. 
39. 	 119 U.S. 199 (1886). 
40. 	 Id. at 204. See note 23 supra. 
41. 	 See text accompanying notes 42-44 infra. 
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This was the issue before the Court in The Tungus v. Skov­
gaard. 42 There, the plaintiff brought a suit for wrongful death 
based on unseaworthiness. 43 The Supreme Court unanimously 
agreed that when the maritime law leaves a survivor without a 
remedy for a death on state territorial waters, the remedy may be 
provided under any applicable state law granting a right of action 
for wrongful death. The Court was divided, however, on whether 
the state statute must be incorporated as a whole or whether 
selected provisions could be independently incorporated while 
others were ignored. The issue arose because the negligence stan­
dard of care imposed on the defendant by the relevant New Jersey 
statute was less stringent than that which would have been re­
quired of him under federal maritime law had the injury not re­
sulted in death. 44 The majority held that "when admiralty adopts a 
State's right of action for wrongful death, it must enforce the right 
as an integrated whole, with whatever conditions and limitations 
the creating State has attached. "45 The Court found that the state 
wrongful death statute encompassed an action under federal mari­
time law, but that the duty of care was governed by state law. 
The dissent would have held that federal maritime law could 
utilize state law to supply the "right" to sue, without regard to any 
substantive limitations contained in the state law. 46 It reasoned that 
since the standard of care allegedly breached was one grounded in 
federal law, that standard should not differ from state to state. "It 
would be a strained statement of the effect of The Harrisburg" to 
say that because there is no common law wrongful death remedy 
under maritime law there is "no duty imposed by the maritime law 
not to kill persons. . . . "47 Even where the injured party seeks to 
enforce a state created remedy, federal standards should control. 48 
42. 358 U.S. 588 (1959). 
43. [d. at 589-90. 
44. [d. at 594. Under maritime law the defendant owed the deceased the duty 
to maintain the vessel in a seaworthy condition. A breach of the duty of seaworthi­
ness establishes strict liability. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). 
Under the state wrongful death statute, the defendant only owed the deceased the 
duty to exercise ordinary care in maintaining a safe work area. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 
31-1 (West 1952). 
45. 358 U.s. at 592. The Colorado Supreme Court in Jones v. Hildebrant relied 
on The Tungus as authority for its ruling that the Colorado rule of damages applied 
to a § 1983 action. See note 98 infra. 
46. 358 U.S. at 597-99. 
47. [d. at 601. 
48. [d. at 601-02. See also Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 
(1953). If federal standards were to control, the duty imposed under maritime law 
would not differ from state to state, or otherwise, merely because the injury resulted 
in death. 
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"It is enough" that the state furnish the remedy "in a general way." 
The right to maintain an action for wrongful death should be de­
rived from state law without applying any substantive conditions 
or limitations it might contain. 49 According to the dissent, the ma­
jority decision was "contrary to one of the basic principles" of 
law, 50 that similarly injured persons should be able to obtain 
similar remedies. The anomalous result that different laws govern, 
depending on whether conduct kills or merely injures its victims, 
was a "conscious choice of a nonuniform solution on an essential 
matter. "51 
The issue debated in The Tungus was finally disposed of by 
the Supreme Court in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. 52 
Moragne also involved an action for wrongful death based on un­
seaworthiness. The case was before the Court on appeal from the 
Florida Supreme Court. 53 Following the rule of The Harrisburg, 54 
the Florida Supreme Court had looked to the state wrongful death 
statute for a remedy. 55 It dismissed the action, however, because it 
held that lack of ordinary care had not been pleaded or proved and 
the state statute did not encompass a wrongful death action based 
on unseaworthiness. 56 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed on the basis of The Tungus. 57 The plaintiff was left with­
out a remedy since no wrongful death action could be maintained 
directly under maritime law and the available state remedy proved 
to be inadequate. Re-examining the ruling in The Hamsburg, and 
noting the confusion resulting from its decision in The Tungus, the 
United States Supreme Court overruled The Harrisburg and created 
a common law action for wrongful death in federal maritime law. 58 
49. 358 U.S. at 609. 
50. ld. The dissent spoke in terms of admiralty law but the principle is equally 
applicable to civil rights law. The extent of the role played by state law under The 
Tungus decision had been the subject of substantial debate and uncertainty in the 
Supreme Court, with opinions on both sides of the question acknowledging the 
shortcomings in the law. See Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960), and Goett v. 
Union Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340 (1960). 
51. 358 U.S. at 609. 
52. 398 U.S. 375 (1970). Instead of deciding whether partial incorporation of a 
state statute is permissible, the Court circumvented the issue by creating a federal 
common law action for wrongful death in maritime law. See text accompanying notes 
57-58 infra. 
53. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1968). 
54. See note 39 supra and accompanying text. 
55. 211 So. 2d at 162. 
56. ld. at 167. 
57. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 409 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1969). 
58. 398 U.S. at 388-90. At least two states have relied on Moragne in recogniz­
158 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:149 
In a carefully reasoned decision, the Moragne Court noted the 
analytical and practical difficulties of the old rule and discarded it 
for several reasons. First, every state has enacted a wrongful death 
statute. 59 This indicates that there is a uniform national policy of 
providing a remedy for wrongful death. Second, the Court rec­
ognized that Congress has provided for wrongful death actions in 
some areas of federal law. 60 Thus, the Court did not perceive a 
congressional policy against this type of remedy. Finally, it re­
garded the rule of The Harrisburg as unacceptably cumbersome; it 
had become an "increasingly unjustifiable anomaly" as the law over 
the years had changed. Together with its corollary, The Tungus, it 
had produced "litigation-spawning confusion in an area that should 
be easily susceptible of more workable solutions. "61 Implicit in the 
Court's rationale is the idea that when a federal right is asserted, 
federal law should govern. 62 Further support for this idea is de­
rived from several courts that have had the opportunity to interpret 
the Brazier decision. 
ing a wrongful death remedy of common law ongm. See Gaudette v. Webb, 362 
Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972); Barnette v. Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc., 89 Misc. 2d 
350, 391 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. 1977). But see Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 
P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977), in which the court stated that it did not question 
the soundness of Moragne but that it felt it could not follow Gaudette because it 
was persuaded that the California legislature had intended to occupy the field of 
recovery for wrongful death by enacting the state wrongful death statute. The court 
held that the state legislature could, and did, modify the common law by enacting the 
California wrongful death statute. [d. at 573-75, 565 P.2d at 128-29, 139 Cal. Rptr. 
at 103-04. 
Relying on Moragne, one district court has held that there is an "extension" 
provision, as a matter of federal common law, similar to those found in state law, in 
§ 502 of the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (Supp. V 
1975), although the remedy is ordinarily a creature of statute. Wayne Chern. v. Col­
umbus Agency Servo Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ind. 1977). 
59. 398 U.S. at 390. See Comment, Wrongful Death Damages in North 
Carolina, 44 N.C. L. REV. 402 (1966). 
60. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1970) (wrongful death 
of railroad employees); Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970) (of merchant seamen); 
Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761, 762 (1970) (of persons on the high 
seas); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.c. § 1346(b) (1970) (made the United States 
subject to liability in certain circumstances for negligently caused wrongful death to 
the same extent as a private person). The Moragne Court concluded that the Jones 
Act and the Death on the High Seas Act were not intended to preclude the availabil­
ity of a remedy for wrongful death under general maritime law in situations not 
covered by those acts. 398 U.S. at 390-93. 
61. 398 U.S. at 404. 
62. [d. at 378, 404-05. 
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II. BEYOND BRAZIER: CREATING FEDERAL COMMON LAw 

WHEN INCORPORATION OF STATE LAw DOES NOT 

PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE REMEDY 

In Jones v. Hildebrant, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled 
that the damages recoverable in a wrongful death action brought 
pursuant to section 1983 are controlled by state law. 63 The court 
concluded that federal policy required the incorporation of the 
state wrongful death remedy as an integrated whole. This percep­
tion of federal policy is inaccurate. Federal courts will incorporate 
state law when it is needed to provide an adequate remedy. How­
ever, where total incorporation fails to accomplish this goal, the 
courts have fashioned appropriate remedies ranging from the in­
corporation of selected portions of state law to the creation of fed­
eral common law. 
This flexible approach is the outgrowth of the United States
•Supreme Court's decision in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park. 64 Sul­
livan involved the availability of damages in a discrimination suit. 65 
The suit was instituted under section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act66 
which, like section 1983, makes no express provision for awarding 
damages. The Court was persuaded, however, that the "existence 
of a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and ap­
propriate remedies. "67 Interpreting section 1988 and the holding in 
Brazier, the Court held that both federal and state rules on dam­
ages may be used, whichever best serves the policies expressed in 
the federal statutes. 68 "The rule of damages, whether drawn from 
federal or state sources, is a federal rule responsive to the need 
whenever a federal right is impaired. "69 Thus, the only limitation 
63. See text accompanying notes 14-18 supra. 
64. 396 U.S. 229 (1969). 
65. Id. at 235-38. Plaintiff sued for discrimination in the disposition of property. 
Little Hunting Park is a Virginia non-stock corporation operating playground 
facilities and a community park for residents in an area of Fairfax County, Virginia. A 
membership share entitles the shareholder to use the facilities, and, under the corpo­
ration bylaws, when a member rents her home she may assign the membership 
share. The board of directors of Little Hunting Park refused to approve the assign­
ment because the plaintiff was black. I d. at 234-35. 
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) provides: "All citizens of the United States shall 
have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens 
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 
67. 396 U.S. at 239 (citations omitted). 
68. Id. at 240. For an analogous approach see Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 
408-09 (1961). 
69. 396 U.S. at 240 (emphasis added). 
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upon the use of state law is that it must be suitable to effect the 
purposes of the civil rights laws. State law is used only to the ex­
tent that it is available to overcome any deficiency in the federal 
statute. 70 At least two federal courts of appeals have followed the 
Sullivan approach and allowed recovery of punitive damages in sec­
tion 1983 actions even when state law did not permit them. 
Basista v. Weir71 was an action brought pursuant to section 
1983 for unlawful arrest and detention. 72 The issue before the court 
was the availability of punitive damages. 73 Section 1983 is silent on 
the kind of damages recoverable by an injured party. The statute 
only states that the offending person "shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law."74 These words connote damages of 
some kind, but the statute does not explain what kind. Since the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals had determined that the federal 
common law was deficient on the issue of punitive damages, the 
court followed the Brazier approach and looked to the applicable 
state law. The state law did not allow punitive damages absent a 
showing of actual damages. 75 Since the plaintiff had suffered no 
actual damages, he would be entitled to recover only nominal dam­
ages76 if the state law were applied. The Third Circuit refused to 
apply the state law, because it understood the injustice that could 
result from applying federal common law to determine compensa­
tory damages, while at the same time using state law to measure 
70. 293 F.2d at 408. 
71. 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965). 
72. Id. 
73. [d. at 87. Punitive, or exemplary, damages are damages awarded to the 
plaintiff over and above bare compensation for property loss, where the wrong done 
to him was aggravated by circumstances of violence, oppression, malice, fraud, or 
wanton and wicked conduct on the part of the defendant. These damages are in­
tended to give solace to the plaintiff for mental anguish, laceration of his feelings, 
shame, degradation, or other aggravations of the original wrong; or else to punish the 
defendant for his evil behavior or to make an example of him. BLACK'S LAW DIC­
TIONARY 467-68 (rev. 4th ed. 1976). 
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1983, reproduced at note 3 supra. 
75. 340 F.2d at 87. Actual damages are synonymous with compensatory dam­
ages and are "[rJeal, substantial and just damages, or the amount awarded to a com­
plainant in compensation for his actual and real loss or injury...." BLACK'S LAw 
DICTIONARY 467 (rev. 4th ed. 1976). 
76. 340 F.2d at 88. Nominal damages are a trifling sum awarded to a plaintiff in 
an action in which there is no substantial loss or injury to be compensated. The law 
recognizes a technical invasion of his rights or a breach of the defendant's duty. 
Nominal damages are also awarded when the plaintiff proves a real injury, but the 
evidence failed to show its amount. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 469 (rev. 4th ed. 
1976). 
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punitive damages. 77 The court recognized that the protection af­
forded to individuals by section 1983 was not intended to differ from 
state to state. Therefore, the amount of damages recovered by an in­
jured party should not vary because of the law of the state in which 
the federal suit was commenced. "Federal common law must be 
applied to effect uniformity, otherwise the Civil Rights Acts would 
fail to effect the purposes and ends which Congress intended. "78 As 
a result of this analysis, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
held that federal law permitted the recovery of punitive damages 
even in the absence of actual damages. 79 
This ruling was followed by the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit in Spence v. Staras, 80 in which the plaintiff 
brought wrongful death and survival actions pursuant to section 
1983.81 She sought actual as well as punitive damages for the death 
of her nonverbal, mentally-ill son. As in Basista, the state law did 
not allow punitive damages unless actual damages were first alleged 
and proved. 82 Noting that actual damages would be difficult to 
prove, the Seventh Circuit held that federal common law allows 
punitive damages even in the absence of actual damages "[p]ro­
vided certain aggravating circumstances are shown. "83 Applying 
the rule of Sullivan,84 the court concluded that both federal 
and state rules on damages could be used, whichever best served 
the _policies behind the civil rights laws. 85 The Spence court, con­
sistent with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Basista, refused 
to apply a state damage rule which limited the plaintiff's chances of 
adequate recovery. By refusing to apply state punitive damage lim­
itations, those courts have broadened the availability of suitable 
relief to meet the needs of a particular case. In some cases this 
"suitable remedy" approach has taken federal courts past the tech­
nique of selective incorporation of state law. 86 For example, in a re­
77. 340 F.2d at 86. 
78. Id. (footnote omitted). 
79. Id. at 88. 
80. 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974). 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 558 n.4. 
83. Id. at 558. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Basista v. Weir, 
340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965). See also Gill v. Manuel, 488 F.2d 799, 801-02 (9th Cir. 
1973), and Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799 (1st Cir.), cert.denied, 393 U.S. 940 
(1968). 
84. See notes 64-65 supra and accompanying text. 
85. 507 F.2d at 558. 
86. It should make no difference whether it is a federal or state court. See note 
30 supra. 
162 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:149 
cent decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ignored 
state law altogether and instead created federal common law to 
prevent a section 1983 action from abating at the death of the 
plaintiff. 
In this decision, Shaw v. Garrison,87 the plaintiff sued James 
Garrison, onetime New Orleans District Attorney, under section 
1983 for an allegedly unlawful prosecution of Shaw for complicity 
in the assassination of President Kennedy.88 After instituting the 
action, the plaintiff died. 89 Following its own analysis in Brazier, 
the court of appeals recognized that the civil rights statutes are 
deficient in that they fail to provide for the survival of an action 
after the death of a plaintiff. 90 Therefore, the court concluded that 
the state survivorship law would apply unless that law was "in­
consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."91 
Under state law,92 Shaw's suit would abate since he had no stat­
utory survivors.93 The court therefore refused to apply the state 
law, reasoning that it was inconsistent with the broad remedial 
purposes embodied in the civil rights laws. It viewed the civil 
rights statutes as "designed to insure to all citizens" the right to 
-be free from deprivations of constitutionally secured civil rights. 94 
Since the state law in Shaw was unable to provide the relief en­
visioned by Congress in enacting section 1983, the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit looked beyond it and held that the action 
survived in favor of Shaw's estate as a matter of federal common 
law. 95 
87. 545 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1977). 
88. Id. at 981. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 983. This should not be confused with survival actions brought by the 
survivors of the deceased in their representative capacity. Other courts, including the 
United States Supreme Court, have reached the same conclusion as that reached by 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Shaw. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 
693, 702 n.14 (1973); Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153, 155 (8th Cir. 1961). 
91. 545 F.2d at 983 (quoting § 1988). 
92. Id. at 981. 
93. Id. at 980. 
94. Id. at 983. 
95. Support for this decision was derived from the United States Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the authority granted by § 1988. In Moor v. County of 
Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), the Supreme Court held that state law can be used 
only if it is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. Id. at 
706. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West Supp. 1977), reproduced at note 28 supra. Since 
the civil rights statutes are laws of the United States, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit concluded that Congress was concerned about the possibility of hostile 
state law interfering with the policy and purposes of the civil rights laws. 545 F.2d at 
983. 
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From cases such as Sullivan, Basista, Spence, and Shaw, the 
willingness of federal courts to fashion appropriate remedies for 
civil rights violations is apparent. The federal judiciary has consis­
tently maintained a flexible approach. If state law is beneficial to 
the plaintiff's cause of action in one respect but adverse to it in 
another, the federal courts will ignore those state provisions which 
restrict the plaintiff's ability to obtain a meaningful remedy. In 
cases where state law is totally unavailable, the courts have 
fashioned suitable remedies by creating federal common law to fill 
the gaps in the federal provisions. Whatever the facts of the case 
may be, the policy of federal courts is to do what is necessary to 
effect the purposes of the civil rights laws. 
III. 	 JONES v. HILDEBRANT IN LIGHT OF FEDERAL PRECEDENTS 
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the Supreme 
Court of Colorado did not understand how federal courts approach 
the difficult problems in federal-state relations that are involved 
when a plaintiff seeks recovery for wrongful death under the fed­
eral civil rights statutes. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with 
Mrs. Jones that section 1983 permits the incorporation of state 
wrongful death statutes into section 1983 actions. 96 However, since 
the action was brought in state court and joined with a state claim 
under the state wrongful death statute, the court held that the two 
claims had "merged,"97 and dismissed the section 1983 claim. 
The court based its reasoning on a belief that even if the suit 
had been brought in federal court, relief would have been provided 
according to a wholly incorporated state statute. 98 Thus, in the 
view of the Colorado Supreme Court, the state remedy was 
"broader" because it, unlike section 1983, allowed the City and 
County of Denver to be sued. Section 1983 was in no sense 
broader because "whole incorporation" imposed the dollar limita­
tion of the state remedy on ahy potential recovery under section 
1983. In reaching this result, the court relied on The Tungus, 
96. 550 P.2d at 343. 
97. Id. at 344. The only reason given for the merger and dismissal was that the 
state claim provided a broader remedy because it allowed recovery against the City 
and County of Denver. Id. at 344 n.7. The merger and dismissal is a major source of 
confusion in the Colorado Supreme Court decision. See note 18 supra and accom­
panying text. 
98. 550 P.2d at 344 n.8. Citing The Tungus, the court stated its own ruling 
accords "with what appears to be the federal policy of wholly incorporating state 
wrongful death remedies when incorporation of state law is the Congressional in­
tent." 
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which held that state law must be incorporated as an integrated 
whole, even when the law puts substantive limitations on the plain­
tiff's right to recover. 99 
However, the Colorado Supreme Court did not recognize sev­
eral major developments in federal law since The Tungus was de­
cided in 1959. First, by overruling The Harrisburg, and creating 
federal common law, Moragne has substantially weakened the 
"whole incorporation" rule of The Tungus. 100 The rule of The Tun­
gus is no longer applied in maritime law, the context in which it 
was formulated. In Moragne, moreover, the Supreme Court inti­
mated that it was adopting the position of The Tungus dissent: that 
liability for the breach of a federally imposed duty should not be 
subject to potential differences in state law. lol 
Many federal courts have recognized that in enacting section 
1983, Congress intended to create a federal cause of action separate 
from the remedies afforded under state law,102 and therefore that 
state law should not be used to limit the recovery available under 
the federal statute. Those courts have taken a very flexible approach 
in section 1983 actions, "incorporating" state law only to the extent 
necessary to effect the policy behind the civil rights statutes. When 
incorporation of state law cannot provide the injured party with a 
suitable remedy, a remedy will be fashioned as a matter of federal 
common law. 
The state law used in Jones v. Hildebrant was helpful since it 
provided the plaintiff with a "right" to bring her suit. State laws 
should be used to that extent only. Federal rules of damages 
should apply instead of the diverse rules of damages found in the 
state wrongful death laws. Local concerns reflected in state statutes 
which would bar or substantially limit the plaintiff's chance of re­
covery should give way to the policies expressed in the civil rights 
laws. 
The Colorado statute, together with its net pecuniary loss limi­
tation, does not provide adequate redress in a situation in which, 
as in Jones, the financial loss suffered as a result of death is merely 
intangible. l03 This type of damage rule should not be permitted 
99. 358 U.S. at 592. 
100. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text. 
101. Compare Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 405 (1970), 
with The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 602 (1959). 
102. See note 26 supra. 
103. 550 P.2d at 341-42. The Colorado net pecuniary loss rule bars recovery for 
loss of society and punitive damages. Mrs. Jones' provable damages consisted of fu­
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to control in a section 1983 suit. "The rule of damages, whether 
drawn from federal or state sources, is a federal rule responsive to 
the need whenever a federal right is impaired. "104 
IV. CONCLUSION 
To avoid potential differences in allowable damages, a simple 
solution is available: the creation of a common law wrongful death 
action under federal law. There is little difference between creating 
federal common law to avoid abatement of a section 1983 action at 
the plaintiff's death, as was done in Shaw v. Garrison, and creating 
federal common law to allow actions for wrongful death under sec­
tion 1983. 
The benefits of the civil rights laws were intended to be uni­
form throughout the United States. Those benefits should not be 
impaired because conduct results in death rather than serious in­
jury. In addition, choice of a federal or state forum should not affect 
the protection afforded by section 1983. 105 Adoption of a federal 
neral expenses plus the value of her son's services she lost as a result of his death. 
These damages were offset by the expenses the plaintiff would have incurred in 
raising him. See note 10 supra. .'
104. 396 U.S. at 240 (emphasis added). 
105. The reluctance of state courts to grant relief under § 1983 is an important 
concern in view of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Aldinger v. Howard, 
427 U.S. 1 (1976). In Aldinger, the Court refused to accept pendent party jurisdiction 
over a § 1983 plaintiff's state law claim against the county that employed the plain­
tiff. Since a plaintiff would normally choose to proceed against both individual and 
governmental defendants in one forum, the effect ofAldinger is to force § 1983 claims 
into the state courts. For a discussion of Aldinger and pendent party jurisdiction see 
Note, 87 YALE L.J. 627 (1978). 
The Aldinger decision, however, left open the question whether a local govern­
mental unit can be sued directly under the fourteenth amendment. Thus, one avenue 
that remains open to a § 1983 plaintiff is to also assert a fourteenth amendment claim 
against the city or county. A federal court can accept pendent jurisdiction over the 
state law claim because the city or county is already a party to the federal suit. See, 
e.g., Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1977) (after basing jurisdiction on a 
"substantial" fourteenth amendment question, the court addressed the state law 
claim against the city rather than the more difficult fourteenth amendment issue). 
If the Supreme Court should decide that a local governmental unit cannot be sued 
directly under the fourteenth amendment, then state courts will provide the only 
forum in which a § 1983 plaintiff can sue the individual defendant alld his or her 
city or county employer. 
Jones v. Hildebrant is the only case the author found in which a state court 
awarded damages to a § 1983 plaintiff. Since the federal and state claims were 
merged in JOlles, see note 97 supra and accompanying text, the award was probably 
based on the state claim. Writing in 1969, one commentator noted that he could find 
no state decision awarding relief under § 1983. He further observed that state courts 
usually adopt the expedient of accepting jurisdiction over such claims while dismiss­
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common law rule allowing wrongful death actions under section 
1983 without regard to state law is desirable since it would foster 
the uniform application of the statute. As the Supreme Court con­
cluded, "federal courts may use any available remedy to make good 
the wrong done. "106 The creation of federal common law is an avail­
able remedy which should be used. 
Michael]. Houlihan 
iug them on the merits. See Note, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1486, 1497 n.62 (1969). In a re­
cent New York decision, the court did just that. Brody v. Leamy, 90 Misc. 2d 1, 393 
N.Y.S.2d 243 (Sup. Ct. 1977). See also note 30 supra. 
Dissatisfaction with the present scope of § 1983 has led one commentator to 
suggest that the statute be amended to allow suits against state and local govern­
ments. See Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 
1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 455-57 n.38 
(1978). 
106. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (footnote omitted). 
